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SCHMIDT v. BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY:
RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS IN PUBLIC
HOUSING
The Fair Housing Act of 1968' (FHA) prohibits2 racially discrimi-
natory housing practices.3 Judicial interpretation has characterized
the Act as establishing a national goal of integrated living patterns.4
Despite broad construction of the proofs and standing6 components
1. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1976)
2. Id. §§ 3604-06. Title VIII proscribes discrimination in the sale, rental and
financing of housing as well as in the administration of brokerage services. Id. Single
family dwellings sold or rented without broker service and units in owner-occupied
dwellings housing no more than four families are exempted from the sale and rental
provisions of the Act. Id. § 3603(b). Although exempt from the FHA, discrimination
in such sales or rentals violates the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
The Supreme Court has held that the 1968 Act prohibits "all racial discrimination,
private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 421 (1968) (emphasis in original).
3. Housing discrimination by the federal government (see, e.g., Hills v. Gau-
treaux, 425 U.S. 284, 289 (1976)), local governments (see, e.g., Note, Racial Discrimi-
nation in Public Housing Site Selection, 23 STAN. L. REv. 63 (1970)) and private
institutions has been common. Recently, there has been a tendency toward racial
steering (See Note, Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman: Extending Standing in Racial
Steering Cases To Housing Associations and Testers, 22 URBAN L. ANN. 107 (1981);
Note, Racial Steering- The Real Estate Broker and Tile VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808
(1976)) and blockbusting (see Note, Blockbusting, 59 GEO. L.J. 170 (1970)) on the part
of real estate brokers. Steering encompasses "any action by a real estate agent which
in any way impedes, delays, or discourages on a racial basis a prospective home buyer
from purchasing housing." Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp 1028, 1047 (E.D. Mich.
1975), aff'd and remanded mem. 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977). See also Havens Re-
alty Corp. v. Coleman, 50 U.S.L.W. 4232 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982).
4. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting
with approval the statement of Senator Mondale, 114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968)).
5. A plaintiff need only show discriminatory effect to make out a prima facie
claim under Title VIII. See, e.g., Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arling-
ton Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
See generally Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 199, 238-61 (1978).
6. Standing requirements under the FHA extend its application as broadly as con-
stitutionally permissible. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208-
12 (1972). In Trafficante, the Court allowed white individuals to challenge actions
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of the Act, segregated housing still prevails throughout the United
States.7 In an attempt to alleviate the remnants of past discrimina-
tion8 and produce racially balanced communities,9 many local hous-
ing authorities have implemented programs utilizing benign access
quotas.' 0 The use of racial classification renders these programs sus-
depriving them of the benefit of interracial association. Gladstone Realtors v. Village
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979), extended the Trafficante ruling to include municipal
plaintiffs. Id. at 109-11.
7. In 1970, 72 percent of American blacks lived in areas where the black popula-
tion exceeded 50 percent of the total local population. A. SCHNARE, THE PERSIS-
TENCE OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN HOUSING 9 (1978). See generally U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1978 (1979). For a brief discussion of discrimination in the United States see
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THIRTY YEARS AFTER BROWN:
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 1-13 (1973).
8. See N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION (1975), which points out that
since the median black income equals only 60% of that received by whites, blacks
have had a more limited selection than have whites in the range of affordable hous-
ing. This income differential coupled with exclusionary zoning practices has com-
pelled a vast number of blacks to accept less expensive housing available primarily in
the central cities. Id. at 135.
9. See, e.g., D. FALK & H. FRANKLIN, EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY: THE UN-
FINISHED FEDERAL AGENDA (1976); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FED-
ERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT (1979).
10. Benign access quotas that limit the number of blacks who may enter a com-
munity have been implemented to prevent resegregation, a phenomenon caused by
"white flight." This situation occurs when the proportion of black residents reaches
the "tipping point," the point at which white flight accelerates and results in resegre-
gation. See Schelling, A Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Toping, in
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 157-84 (A. Pascal ed. 1972). The term
"community" may encompass a single neighborhood or an entire urban area. See
Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134-37 (2d Cir. 1973). For a
discussion of the various definitions of community see generally A. DoWNs, URBAN
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 43-48 (1970). To most blacks, an integrated community is
approximately 50 percent black, but most whites consider a community integrated if
only a few black residenfs live there. White opposition to black neighbors does not
necessarily stem from a hatred of blacks but rather from a desire to remain culturally
dominant in a community. See, e.g., A. DoWNs supra at 34-37; Farley, Branche &
Colasanto, Barriers to the Racial Integration of Neighborhoods. The Detroit Case, 441
ANNALS 97 (1979); Taylor, Housing Neighborhoods, and Race Relations. Recent Sur-
vey Evidence, 441 ANNALS 26, 39 (1979). Due to the high mobility of Americans, the
tipping point can be reached without white residents leaving the community at an
abnormal rate. See Mayer, Russel Woods: Change Without Conflict, in STUDIES IN
HOUSING AND MINORITY GROUPS, 198 (N. Glazer & D. McEntire eds. 1960). The
tipping point is often estimated to occur once a neighborhood becomes approximately
25 to 30 percent black, but the exact proportion depends on the white residents and
their fears about the change in character of the community and the decline in prop-
erty values. These expectations typically become self-fulfilling prophecies. See J.
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ceptible to constitutional"' and statutory' 2 attack. In Schmidt v. Bos-
ton Housing Authority, 13 the United States District Court of
Massachusetts held that absent a showing of discriminatory effect, the
use of benign access quotas does not violate Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968.' 4
In Schmidt, white residents of South Boston brought a class action
suit "'5 alleging that defendant Boston Housing Authority (BHA) vio-
lated Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.16 Plaintiffs claimed
the Tenant Selection and Assignment Plan (the Plan) adopted by the
BHA 7 deprived them of an opportunity to rent' 8 or secure trans-
HECHT, BECAUSE IT Is RIGHT 34-35 (1970); Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota,
6 How. L.J. 30, 34-35 (1960). But cf. Frey, Central City Wf'hite Right: Racial and
Nonracial Causes, 44 J. AM. Soc. REv. 425 (1979) (proposing as a hypothesis that
economic and environmental deterioration are more important than social factors in
white decisions to leave a community). The concept of tipping is the motivating fac-
tor behind access quotas which limit the number of minorities into a particular area.
Without such programs many experts believe that fair housing programs will do little
but change the location of the black ghettos. See generally Schelling, supra.
11. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2. For a discus-
sion of decisions applying constitutional scrutiny to benign access quotas, see notes
41-55 and accompanying text infra.
12. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604 (1976). For a discussion of cases dealing with statutory issues raised by benign
access quotas, see notes 54-64 and accompanying text infra.
13. 505 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1981).
14. Id. at 997.
15. Id. at 990. Four classes of white, life-long residents of South Boston brought
suit. Class One consisted of white elderly residents of South Boston who had applied
for low income housing; Class Two consisted of white applicants for low income
housing who resided in South Boston; Class Three consisted of white BHA tenants
who resided in low income housing in South Boston and had applied for transfers to
low income housing in that community; and Class Four consisted of leaders of the
South Boston community. Id.
16. Id. at 995. In particular plaintiffs in Schmidt asserted BHA violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(b), (d) (1976). Section 3604(b) makes it unlawful "to discriminate against any
person in the sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith, because of race, color, religion or national origin," Id.
§ 3604(b). § 3604(d) makes it unlawful "to represent to any person because of race,
color, religion or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale,
or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available." Id. § 3604(d).
17. 505 F. Supp at 990. The BHA plan was outlined in a 1977 consent decree
entered in a desegregation suit in the Suffolk Superior Court (Perez v. Boston Hous.
Auth., Suffolk Sup. Ct. No. 17222). The Plan was submitted to the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Massachusetts Department of
Community Affairs (DCA) for approval. The Plan was approved and implemented
1982]
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fers19 to low income housing in South Boston.2" Under the Plan, ap-
plicants seeking residence at a BHA development where their race
was substantially in the minority received priority status.2 Since all
of the BHA projects in South Boston had a white occupancy of at
least 90 percent,22 plaintiffs did not receive minority status at any of
the developments where they desired to live.2 3 The Schmidt court
held that to merit Title VIII relief plaintiffs need only prove facts
in June, 1978. Essentially, the Plan established a system of priorities for tenant as-
signment and selection, according priority to those applicants and transfer applicants
who chose to be housed at a BHA development in which their race was substantially
in the minority. Id. at 991-92.
18. Id. at 990-91. Classes One and Two claimed they could not obtain units in
South Boston public housing due to the Plan. Id.
19. Id. at 991. Class Three claimed that they could not obtain transfers from the
low income projects in which they presently lived to a BHA project in South Boston.
Id.
20. Id. at 992. The plaintiffs could have obtained low income units in other sec-
tions of the city. Id.
21. Id. at 991-92. Section V(B)(5)(c) of the Plan defines a minority preference
applicant as follows:
Any applicant who chooses to be housed at a development in which his/her race
(white, black. . . .) is substantially in the minority will be given priority over all
other applicants in the first available habitable vacancy . . . except that white
applicants will not be eligible for this priority once the percentage of white ten-
ants in a development reaches fifty percent. A racial group is a substantial mi-
nority when the percentage of tenants of that race living in one development is
less than that racial group's percentage of the total number of people eligible for
public housing in the City of Boston ...
Id. at 995. Section V(B)(5)(d) provides the definition of minority preference transfer
as follows:
Any tenant in resident at an Authority development in which his/her race is not
substantially in the minority will have the right to apply for a transfer to a loca-
tion at which his/her race is substantially in the minority, and will receive prior-
ity over all other transferees and applicants, except for emergency applicants or
transferees, for available vacancies at the project chosen. However, white appli-
cants will not be eligible for this priority once the percentage of white tenants in a
development reaches fifty percent.
Id. at 995.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 991. Under the Plan, an applicant for public housing or for transfer
within the public housing system must accept a housing offer made by BHA within
one week. If the applicant does not timely accept, his or her name is withdrawn from
the waiting list. The applicant may then reapply for housing in which case his or her
name is placed at the bottom of the waiting list. The minority preference system
increases the time on the waiting list for all those applicants who do not choose to be
minority preference applicants. All of the housing developments in South Boston are
"racially imbalanced," defined by the Plan as less than ten percent non-white. Conse-
(Vol. 23.343
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showing discriminatory effect of the Plan.24 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court ruled that the FHA proscribes subtle25 as well as bla-
tant26 forms of discrimination.27 The Schmidt court concluded that if
enforcement required proof of intent, many discriminatory actions
would continue unchecked.2" Despite this lenient approach, the
court dismissed plaintiffs' action for failure to prove facts showing
discriminatory impact.29
After three years of consideration, Congress enacted Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968.30 The bill's proponents3' intended Title
VIII to produce greater housing choices for all minorities and yield
the benefits of integrated living for all of American society.32 Com-
pelled by the findings of the Kerner Commission,33 the sponsors3
4 of
quently, the Plan does not give whites the opportunity to act as minority preference
applicants at any of the South Boston projects. Id. at 992, 995.
24. Id. at 994.
25. For example, subtle discrimination such as economic discrimination, embod-
ied in the discretionary placement of low-income areas and restrictive suburban zon-
ing ordinances, exacerbates racial segregation by constricting the availability of low
income housing in white areas. See J. FEAGIN & C. FEAGIN, DISCRIMINATION
AMERICAN STYLE 155 (1978).
26. For an example of blatant housing discrimination, see note 63 infra.
27. 505 F. Supp. at 994.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 996-97. The statistics presented by plaintiffs revealed that non-whites
are considered as minority preference applicants for twenty-eight housing develop-
ments, and whites are considered as minority preference applicants at twenty-three
housing developments. The court held this difference to be legally insignificant,
showing no discriminatory impact. Id. at 995.
30. See Note, Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement
Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 834, 858, 863
(1969); Comment, The Federal Fair Housing Requirements.- Title V111 of the 1968 Civil
Rights Act, 1969 DUKE L.J. 733, 734. See generally Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legis-
lative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969).
31. In 1967, the Johnson administration introduced civil rights legislation with
fair housing provisions. The bill was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee
without the housing sections. A housing amendment was added to the bill on the
Senate floor. See Dubofsky, supra note 30, at 152-54.
32. See 114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). The Supreme
Court acknowledged this proposition in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S, 205, 210, 211 (1972).
33. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
(1968) finding that "America is dividing into two societies, black and white, separate
and unequal .... I d. at 481. For a description of the effect of the Report in the
passage of Title VIII, see Dubofsky, supra note 30, at 158-59.
34. Senators Mondale and Brooke sponsored the first attempt to pass the Fair
1982]
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the bill recognized and addressed the need to replace the "blight of
segregated housing"35 with "truly integrated living patterns."36
Congress hoped that strict enforcement of Title VIII would end all
types of private and governmental discriminatory housing prac-
tices.37 For the purpose of analysis, racial discrimination in public
housing administration can be characterized as either overt or cov-
ert.38 Overt discrimination describes a situation that occurs when a
regulation, on its face, utilizes race to classify groups of individuals.39
Covert discrimination, on the other hand, arises when a regulation,
containing no classification, produces racially discriminatory re-
sults.4° Recognizing this distinction, federal courts developed differ-
ent analytical standards depending on whether a court characterized
the allegedly discriminatory action as overt or covert.4 '
Since housing regulations rarely contain overt racial classifications,
Housing amendment, but they withdrew their proposal in favor of a compromise
amendment offered by Senator Dirksen. 114 CONG. REc. 980-83 (daily ed. Jan. 26,
1968).
35. 114 CONG. REC. 9559 (1968) (statement of Congressman Celler, Chairman of
the Judiciary Committee).
36. Id. at 3422 (statement of Senator Mondale).
37. See notes 2, 30, 33 and accompanying text supra.
38. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search ofErol-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court.: A Mode/for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1972). See also notes 39-42 and accompanying text infra.
39. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curium approval of a federal
court order holding unconstitutional Alabama statutes requiring racial segregation in
prisons); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (majority sustained a con-
viction for violating a military order during World War II excluding all persons of
Japanese ancestry from designated West Coast areas); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943) (unanimously upholding the curfew orders at issue in Korematsu);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (declaring invalid the West Virginia
statute barring blacks from jury duty).
40. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
41. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 706-
20 (10th ed. 1980). Different lines of analysis developed due to the fact that overt
racial classifications present presumptive evidence that the government decision
maker or decision-making body intended to discriminate on account of race. When
there is no racial classification in the regulation, but there is racially disproportionate
impact, only an inference of intent arises. Courts become suspicious that lurking be-
low the innocent-looking regulation is an intent to discriminate. Proof of intent is not
necessary in the case of overt discrimination while the evidentiary element is the key
issue in the covert line of analysis. Id.
[Vol. 23:343
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Title VIII litigation has centered around the covert line of analysis.42
The primary issue arising in the covert line of cases is whether evi-
dence of purposeful discrimination 41 or mere discriminatory impact"
establishes a statutory violation. Judicial resolution of this issue de-
termines the outcome of many Title VIII cases because discrimina-
tory intent in housing regulation is very difficult to prove.45
The Supreme Court has not addressed the problem of whether
courts should apply an intent or effect test in a Title VIII action.46
Consequently, lower federal courts interpreting Title VIII examine
Supreme Court decisions in other civil rights areas for guidance.47 In
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,48 the Supreme Court unanimously held
that defendant's use of a standardized intelligence test violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 9 The test disqualified black job
applicants at a substantially higher rate than white applicants." The
42. See generally N. GLAZER, supra note 6; J. FEAGIN & C. FEAGIN, DISCRIMINA-
TION AMERICAN STYLE (1978).
43. Purposeful discrimination involves an actual legislative or regulatory decision
based on the intent to discriminate on the basis of race. See generally Schwemm,
From Washington to 4rington Heights and Beyond- Discriminating Purpose in Equal
Protection Litigation, 1977 ILL. L.F. 961.
44. Discriminatory impact occurs as the natural consequences following an offi-
cial decision. There is no requisite mental state associated with this form of actiona-
ble discrimination. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). For a
general discussion of whether motive should outweigh effect, see Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An .4pproach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Motive, 1971 Sup. CT.
REV. 95, 115-118; Ely, Legislative andAdministrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1281-84 (1970); Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal Constitu-
tionalAdjudication, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1887 (1970).
45. See Bogen & Falcon, The Use of Racial Statistics in Fair Housing Cases, 34
MD. L. REV. 59 (1974).
46. The Court has decided this issue in the area of Title VII employment discrimi-
nation (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)), but when faced with the
issue in the field of housing the Court remanded to the Seventh Circuit for considera-
tion (Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977)) and then denied review of the Circuit Court's decision. Metropolitan Hous. v.
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
47. See note 48 and accompanying text infra. See generally Comment, Applying
the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 128
(1976).
48. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 17 (1970) (as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17
(1981 Supp.).
50. 401 U.S. at 429. Duke Power also required a high school diploma for accept-
ance to a higher paying job. Id. The evidence showed 58 percent of the white appli-
cants passed the test while among black applicants only 6 percent passed. In addition,
1982]
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Court asserted that unless defendant showed that the test results sub-
stantially related to job performance,5' the discriminatory impact
alone would render the hiring practice invalid. 2 Choosing not to
analyze the specific language of Title VII, the Court based its deci-
sion on the larger policy objective of Congress to produce equal em-
ployment opportunities. 3 The Court concluded that strict statutory
construction would leave subtle forms of discrimination
undetected. 4
If the Supreme Court applied only the Griggs impact test in em-
ployment discrimination cases, application of the impact test to Title
VIII litigation would follow naturally. In Washington v. Davis,51
however, the Court upheld a municipal police department's use of a
verbal skills test 56 even though as between black and white recruits a
much larger proportion of blacks failed the test. 7 The Davis court
drew a distinction between plaintiff's equal protection and Title VII
claims.58 The Court stated that plaintiffs must show discriminatory
intent to establish the constitutional violation, and that the Griggs
impact test operates only with respect to the statutory claim.59
only 12 percent of the black males in the state had completed high school while 34
percent of the white males had received a diploma. Id. at 430 n.6.
51. Id. at 431-32. The Court reasoned that the burden should be placed on the
employer because only the employer knows the true reasons for implementing the
practice. The employer stands in a better position to show the business rationale be-
hind such decisions. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id at 432. Plaintiffs' claim was based on § 703(a) of Title VII which makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual "because of such indi-
vidual's race." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970) (as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2a
(Supp. 1981). The Court did discuss the intent element that might be inferred from
"the because of' language. See Schwemm, Discriminating Effect and the Fair Hotusing
Act, 54 HARv. L. REv. 199, 214-15 (1978).
54. 401 U.S. at 432.
55. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
56. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd 426 U.S. 229
(1976). (The examination was used by the District of Columbia Police Department to
screen recruits.).
57. 512 F.2d at 958-59. The failure rate of black applicants who took the test was
57 percent as compared to a failure rate of 13 percent for whites. Id.
58. 426 U.S. 229 at 239-245; 246-248.
59. Id. The true significance of Davis for fair housing purposes lies in its conclu-
sion that the same action may be judged by two different standards depending on
whether plaintiffs bring a statutory or constitutional claim. The Supreme Court did
uphold the police department's test under both tests, so this aspect of the opinion
[Vol, 23:343
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Prior to Davis, several lower federal courts applied the Griggs im-
pact test to Title VIII actions.60 The Eighth Circuit, in United States
v. City of Black Jack,6 held that discriminatory impact alone consti-
tuted a Fair Housing Act violation.6 z In Black Jack, the city tried to
block construction of a low income housing project by refusing to
rezone.63 The Court declined to entertain an equal protection claim
because the federal government rather than a disappointed, prospec-
tive tenant had brought the action.64 The court cited both constitu-
tional65 and statutory66 precedent but finally based its opinion solely
arguably amounts only to dicta. But the Court reviewed the approach a year later in
Arlington Heights. See Gunther, supra note 38.
60. See Kennedy Park Home Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). In Kennedy Park, the Second Circuit held
that equal protection and Title VIII standards were essentially the same. The court
found the requisite discriminatory impact in the city's attempt to block construction
of a low income housing project in an all-white neighborhood. The zoning commis-
sion rezoned the proposed site for recreational purposes. The court associated this
action with a history of segregation to find that Lackawanna violated the Fair Hous-
ing Act. 1d. at 114. See generally Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir.
1976) (holding that race is impermissible factor in housing decision under Title VIII);
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1042 (1975) (applying an effect test to a decision by city to rezone proposed
building site); Williams v. Matthews Company, 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding
discrimination on the part of a real estate developer who used race as a criteria in
building decisions); United Farm Workers of Florida v. City of Delray Beach, 493
F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that once a discriminatory effect is shown the bur-
den shifts to the government to show a compelling state interest and the necessary
nature of the means); Gautreaux v. City of Chicago Hous. Auth., 436 F.2d 306 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971) (holding that choice of housing sites can
not be delayed due to racial hostility). But cf. Boyd v. Lefrak Organization, 509 F.2d
1110, 1113 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975), (Second Circuit holding
disproportionate impact sufficed as proof in an equal protection claim against a gov-
ernmental action but drew a distinction between public and private defendants under
Title VIII). The conclusion in Boyd is unsupported by the language of the statute and
directly at odds with the Davis decision.
61. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
62. 1d. at 1184-85.
63. Id. at 1185. The City of Black Jack, Missouri, passed a zoning ordinance that
prevented the construction of multi-family low income housing units. The city put
forth such justifications as controlling traffic, preventing overcrowded schools and
maintaining property values. The court found these reasons inadequate to justify the
impact felt by minorities in the community. Id.
64. Id. at 1185. The plaintiff in Black Jack brought its claim specifically under 42
U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976) (as amended by 42 U.S.C. 3604(a) (1980)).
65. 508 F.2d at 1184-85.
66. Id.
1982]
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on Title VIII.67 Black Jack stands as the first appellate decision to
sustain a Fair Housing claim exclusively on the basis of discrimina-
tory impact.6
8
The confusion over the appropriate Title VIII standard culminated
in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation.69 In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court reversed the
Seventh Circuit's decision7" that the discriminatory effect test applies
in an equal protection claim.71 Plaintiff brought suit under both Title
VIII and the Fourteenth Amendment,72 claiming that defendant dis-
criminated on the basis of race by refusing to rezone for low income
housing.73 The Court held that the statutory claim should be re-
solved before the constitutional issue.74 The Court further stated
that, in accordance with Washington v. Davis, plaintiffs must show
discriminatory intent to establish an equal protection violation. 5 By
remanding the case to the circuit court for determination of the Title
VIII issue with these instructions,76 the Court suggested a dichotomy
67. Id.
68. This becomes particularly important after the Supreme Court decided Davis
and Arlington Heights because these decisions did not affect the Black Jack precedent
by their holding that equal protection claims require proof of discriminatory intent.
See Schwemm, supra note 3, at 245-46.
69. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
70. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409
(7th Cir. 1975).
71. Id. at 412.
72. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F.
Supp. 208 (1974).
73. The City of Arlington Heights refused to rezone an intended building site to
permit the construction of low to moderate income housing. Three blacks filed suit
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The opponents of the rezoning had focused
on the possibility of falling property values and the desirability of having this land as
a buffer area between residential and commercial districts. 429 U.S. at 258.
74. Id. at 271.
75. Id. at 266-68. The Court elaborated on Davis by stating that a plaintiff need
not prove that a challenged action rests solely on racially discriminatory purposes. If
there is proof of a discriminatory purpose the burden then shifts to the defendant to
show that there were other judicially acceptable reasons for the decision. The Court
outlined several evidentiary sources that may be looked to for proof of discriminatory
intent. They included the historical background of the decision, the specific sequence
of events leading up to the decision, any departures from normal procedure and the
legislative background of the decision. Id.
76. Id. at 272. Justices Marshall, Brennan and White criticized Justice Powell's
opinion for the majority because it reached the constitutional issue. In his dissent,
Justice White reminded the Court that it is the usual practice when a Court of Ap-
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between the statutory and constitutional claims. On remand,77 the
Seventh Circuit decided that a showing of discriminatory effect estab-
lished a Fair Housing Act violation.78
Arlington Heights remains the strongest indication that the
Supreme Court would apply the Griggs impact test to a Title VIII
action.79 Without further direction, however, courts evaluating cov-
ert discrimination must adhere to the two-standard approach left in
the wake of Arlington Heights. This may produce incongruous results
since the same governmental action may comply with the Constitu-
tion and violate the Fair Housing Act.8"
peals renders a decision before it has the benefit of the Court's opinion on the point
(in this instance the Seventh Circuit had made its decision before Davis was handed
down) to vacate the judgment below and remand allowing the lower court to recon-
sider in light of the Court's holding. Id.
77. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1977).
78. Id. at 1290. The Seventh Circuit stated that they had not reached the statu-
tory issue in their prior decision because plaintiffs had not pursued this avenue. The
court drew the analogy to Title VII stating that Congress, by enacting § 3601 of Title
VIII, intended that the same type of interpretation be given to § 703(h) of Title VII.
The District Court also cited Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122,
1134 (2d Cir. 1973), for the proposition that Title VIII should be construed broadly to
enable open, integrated housing. 558 F.2d at 1284.
The Seventh Circuit elaborated on the Supreme Court decision remanding Arling-
ton Heights by outlining four critical factors that must be examined to determine
whether defendant's action violates Title VIII. The first factor is the strength of plain-
tiffs' showing of discriminatory effect. The court held that the City of Arlington
Heights' refusal to rezone perpetuated a history of segregation. The city was 99 per-
cent white, and the waiting list for low income housing was 95 percent black. The
second factor is whether plaintiffs have made some showing of discriminatory intent
although not the amount needed to prove an equal protection violation. The Court
said this was the least important factor of all, pointing to Black Jack as a situation
where partial evidence of intent can be misleading. The third factor takes into con-
sideration the defendant's interest in taking the action. The court distinguished be-
tween a private individual seeking to protect property rights and a governmental
entity acting outside its scope of authority. The fourth factor is the nature of relief
sought by the plaintiff. Under this factor courts should be more reluctant to grant
relief when plaintiff wants to force defendant to take some affirmative remedial ac-
tion. If plaintiff merely wants to enjoin defendant from blocking construction of a
development the courts should respond more readily. Id. at 1290-93.
79. For a case citing Arlington Heights for this proposition, see Joseph Skillken &
Co. v. City of Toledo, 528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S.
1068 (1977), on remand, 558 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1978).
80. This paradox may arise due to the different burdens of proof that attach to an
allegation claiming a constitutional violation and an allegation claiming a statutory
violation. Although a court may be confronted with the same governmental action,
the result may ultimately turn on whether the complaint is couched in constitutional
1982]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
Although most Title VIII litigation addresses covert discrimina-
tion,8 the implementation of affirmative action programs by govern-
mental authorities requires courts to determine the validity of benign
overt racial classifications.8 2 The Supreme Court recently completed
a trilogy of cases dealing with affirmative action programs.83 These
cases attempt to define the appropriate level of scrutiny courts should
use to evaluate the validity of benign racial classifications.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 4 a divided
Supreme Court8" held invalid the Davis Medical School's use of ra-
cial classifications86 in its special admission program.8 7 Justice Pow-
ell, announcing the judgment of the Court, stated that although the
Davis admissions program was unconstitutional, the equal protection
clause did not prohibit limited use of race in the admissions pro-
cess.18 Justice Powell found strict scrutiny 9 the appropriate level of
or statutory terms. See notes 41-43 supra. If a plaintiff alleges a statutory violation
all that must be shown is a disparate impact while on the other hand if the same
plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation proof of discriminatory intent is necessary
to obtain relief. The result of this dichotomy is that most plaintiffs will allege both
statutory and constitutional violations, hoping of course, that the court win only re-
quire the lesser showing of impact thus making a constitutional analysis unnecessary.
See notes 41-43, 75-76 supra.
81. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
82. Affirmative action programs in the area of housing are aimed at preventing
white flight and resegregation as well as promoting initial integration. See note 10
supra.
83. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 19 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978).
84. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
85. Id. at 265-66. Justice Powell announced the Court's judgment and filed an
opinion in which Justice White joined in Parts I, III-A and V-C. Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun joined in Parts I and V-C of the Powell opinion. Justice
Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun filed a separate opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun also
filed separate opinions. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist joined. Id.
86. Id. at 266. The University of California at Davis special admission program
reserved sixteen of the one hundred places in each entering class exclusively for mi-
norities. Id.
87. Id. at 287. Five Justices (Powell, Brennan, Blackmun, White and Marshall,
J.J.) decided the question on constitutional grounds. Four Justices (Stevens, Burger,
Stewart and Rehnquist, J.J.) never reached the constitutional issue, deciding that Title
VI totally precluded any use of race. Id.
88. Id. at 270. Mr. Justice Powell felt that race could be used as one consideration
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examination to determine the constitutionality of benign racial classi-
fications." In a separate opinion,9' Justice Brennan concluded that a
more lenient, middle tier analysis92 better suited this equal protection
controversy. Since neither Powell nor Brennan could capture a ma-
jority of the Court,93 Bakke did little to clarify the appropriate stan-
dard by which to judge race-conscious affirmative action programs.94
In United Steelworkers of ,4merica v. Weber,9" the Court addressed
a race-conscious affirmative action program implemented by a pri-
vate employer.96 Plaintiff, a white employee, brought a Title VII
challenge97 against defendants on-the-job training program which re-
in determining the basic qualifications of an applicant. Justice Powell thought that
the Harvard admissions program was acceptable because it did not set numerical lim-
its that resembled a quota. Id. at 315 n.51.
89. The Court developed strict scrutiny as a tool to evaluate racial classifications
in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944), both dealing with the constitutionality of the Japanese relocation
programs during World War II. The test looks for a compelling governmental inter-
est and means that are necessary to the achievement of the objective. See Lee v.
Washington, 390 U.S. 33 (1968) (racial segregation implemented to control unrest at a
federal prison). For a more general discussion of the origin of the strict scrutiny test
going back to footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938),
see G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 541-42 (10th
ed. 1980). In Bakke, Mr. Justice Powell found a compelling governmental interest in
educational diversity but stated that the means utilized by the medical school should
be more narrowly drawn. 438 U.S. at 315.
90. 438 U.S. 315-19.
91. 438 U.S. at 324-79 (separate opinion of Brennan, J.).
92. Id. at 362. The test as outlined in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), re-
quires a program to be substantially related to an important governmental interest.
See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword" In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: 4 Modelfor 4 Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
93. See notes 79, 85, 87 and accompanying text supra.
94. See Lavinsky, The Aiffinative Action Trilogy and Benign Racial ClasspFca-
tions--Evolving Law in Need a/Standards, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1980); Comment,
The Role of Structural Due Process in Equal Protection, 29 KAN. L. REv. 99 (1980).
95. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
96. Id. at 195. Weber involved a Kaiser Aluminum Company training program
which provided that 50 percent of all persons admitted to the company's skilled craft
training program would be black.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1976). In McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273 (1976), the Court held that Title VII protects whites as well as racial minori-
ties from discrimination on the basis of race. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court,
said:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the discharge of "any individ-
ual" because of "such individual's race,". . . . Its terms are not limited to dis-
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quired that blacks fill half of all the available openings.98 The Court
upheld the program, finding it within the area of discretion left by
Title VII to the private sector.99 Justice Brennan, writing for the ma-
jority, concluded that the spirit of the statute sanctioned voluntary,
race-conscious efforts aimed at abolishing traditional patterns of seg-
regation."°° Since the Court decided Weber on narrow statutory
grounds, 10 1 the opinion added little to the constitutional analysis of
affirmative action programs implemented in the public sector.'0 2
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, °3 the Supreme Court rejected a fifth
amendment 1°4 challenge to a provision of the 1977 Public Works
Employment Act 0 5 which required at least ten percent of all public
works projects go to minority business enterprises. 106 All of the Jus-
crimination against members of any particular race .... This conclusion is in
accord with uncontradicted legislative history to the effect that Title VII was in-
tended to "cover white men and white women and all Americans .
427 U.S. at 278-80 (citations omitted).
98. 443 U.S. at 197-99.
99. Id. at 209.
100. Id. at 201.
101. Id. at 204-05. The holding rested on narrow construction of Sections 703(a)
and (d) of Title VII. Id.
102. See Meltzer, The Weber Case. The JudicialAbrogation oftheAnti-discrimina-
tion Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHi. L. REv. 423 (1980). The Weber case was a
limited victory for race-conscious affmative action. Justice Brennan's opinion in
Weber is the only one in the affirmative action trilogy to capture a majority of the
Court. This was perhaps possible because the opinion stressed its limited nature and
refrained from detailed guidance as to circumstances in which race-conscious affirma-
tive action would be appropriate. Id. at 443.
103. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
104. The equal protection component of the fifth amendment's due process clause
was explicitly articulated in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954). Al-
though the concept is now well-settled, the extent to which equal protection concepts
under the fourteenth amendment are incorporated through the fifth amendment and
applied to the federal government has been a subject of dispute. Compare Justice
Brennan's views in Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 (1975) with those of
Justice Stevens in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710 (Supp. 1I 1978).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. I 1978). The section provides:
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant shall be
made under this Act for any local public works project unless the applicant gives
satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per centum of the amount
of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises. For purposes
of this paragraph, the term "minority business enterprise" means a business at
least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of
a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned
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tices comprising the six-to-three majority concluded that by enacting
the set-aside provision Congress intended to remedy the effects of
past discrimination."° Unable to agree on a single approach, the
majority split into three opinions.' Chief Justice Burger, joined by
Justice White, created a "close examination" test'0 9 which the Chief
Justice implied was as strict as that of strict scrutiny." 0 Justice Pow-
ell joined in the judgment but stated that the Chief Justice should
adhere to the structured analysis outlined in Bakke."' The three
other Justices constituting the majority advocated the middle level of
scrutiny. 1 2 Coupled with Bakke, Fullilove indicates that six mem-
bers of the Court use a balancing appoach to evaluate governmental
use of racial classifications to remedy official findings of discrimina-
tion . 13 At present, only one Justice does not accept some race dis-
tinction in affirmative action programs.' 14
The Massachusetts District Court treated Schmidt v. Boston Hous-
ing Authority I 5 as a case involving covert racial discrimination." 6
The court evaluated the validity of the BHA Tenant Selection and
by minority group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, minor-
ity group members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-
speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.
Id.
107. 448 U.S. at 477-78, 503-05, 520.
108. Id. at 453-522. Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion, in which Justices White and Powell joined, Id. at 453-95.
Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 495-517. Justice Marshall filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined.
Id. at 517-22. Justice Stewart fied a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Rehnquist
joined. Id. at 522-32. Justice Stevens fied a dissenting opinion. Id. at 532-54.
109. Id. at 472.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring).
112. id. at 519 (Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun, J.J., concurring).
113. Six members of the Court (Burger, Brennan, White, Marshall .Blackmun,
Powell, J.J.) will use a balancing test of some type to evaluate a governmental use of
racial classifications to remedy an official finding of discrimination. For Justice Ste-
vens, the issue turns on whether the official findings of discrimination are clearly laid
out by the governmental body. Id. at 532-54. See also notes 85-92 and accompanying
text supra.
114. Justice Rehnquist is the only Justice on the Court presently who will not
accept some use of race in a remedial affirmative action program under Title VI or
Title VII. 100 S. Ct. at 522-32.
115. 505 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1981).
116. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
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Assignment Plan by using both the impact" 7 and the intent1 18 stan-
dards of review. The court. applied the Griggs impact analysis to the
Title VIII claim 19 and the Arlington Heights purposeful discrimina-
tion standard to the equal protection issue.12 The court's analytical
approach would merit little criticism had the court correctly charac-
terized the Plan as covert discrimination. In Schmidt, however, the
District Court examined an overt racial classification. 121 The Plan,
on its face, utilized race to determine who received priority status.1
22
In failing to recognize the overt nature of the case, the court erred in
not following the affirmative action analysis developed in Bakke,
Weber and Fullilove. 2
The Schmidt court circumvented the overt analysis by finding the
BHA Plan facially neutral.' 24 The court reached this conclusion be-
cause the Plan considered whites to be minorities if they applied for
housing in a predominantly black populated project, and blacks as
minorities where they sought housing in a predominantly white pro-
ject. 2  This neutrality in terms of classifying persons as minorities
for the assignment of priorities does not nullify the use of race as the
determinative factor." 6 The Plan contained an overt racial classifi-
cation and, as such, merited analysis as an affirmative action pro-
117. For cases relied on by the court, see note 60 supra.
118. The court cited Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), for the
proposition that equal protection required proof of intent. The Schmidt court also
stated that Title VI proscribed only those racial classifications which violate the Equal
Protection Clause, citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 505 F.
Supp. at 992-93.
119. 505 F. Supp at 994-95. The court held the impact to be legally insignificant.
See note 29 supra.
120. 505 F. Supp at 993-96. The court examined the historical background of the
Plan, noting that the program was of a remedial nature designed to comply with
HUD and judicial directives. The court further pointed out the procedures followed
to implement the Plan were not in any way unusual. Id. The Schmidt court utilized
the criteria outlined in Arlington Heights, supra note 75.
121. See notes 16, 20, 39 and accompanying text supra.
122. See notes 19-21 supra.
123. See notes 83-114 and accompanying text supra.
124. 505 F. Supp. at 995.
125. Id.
126. The Supreme Court emphasized this point in note 27 of its decision in Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 274 (1978). The Court said the
University's special admission program involved a purposeful, acknowledged use of
racial criteria and that it was not a situation in which the decision was facially neutral
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gram.'27  Although these programs are new to housing,128 the
extension of the overt analysis to Title VIII claims follows logically
from the Supreme Court's current position in the affirmative action
area. 1
29
The Schmidt court cited Bakke for the proposition that Title VIII,
like Title VI, is coterminous with the equal protection clause.' 30 The
analogy to Bakke should not stop at this point. The Schmidt court
should have proceeded to evaluate the BHA plan in light of the
Supreme Court's treatment of benign racial classifications. Although
the appropriate level of scrutiny remains an unresolved issue,13 1 the
Supreme Court advocates a balancing approach when faced with
race-conscious affirmative action programs. 132 Strict scrutiny is the
most rigorous of the balancing tests articulated by the Court. 33 If
the Schmidt court had found that the Plan could withstand this level
of examination, the same conclusion would have followed under the
less strict, middle-tier approach' 34 formulated by other members of
the Court. If the Schmidt court had chosen strict scrutiny, it could
have applied the test without great difficulty and arrived at the same
result.' 35
and had a disproportionate impact. Any use of race to classify groups of individuals
is necessarily suspect. .d.
127. Id.
128. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
129. See notes 83-114 and accompanying text supra.
130. 505 F. Supp. at 993.
131. See notes 89, 92, 113 and 114 supra.
132. See notes 113 and 114 supra.
133. See note 89 supra.
134. See note 92 supra.
135. If the Schmidt court had undertaken this task, it first would have determined
whether residential integration rises to a compelling governmental interest. In the
areas of education (Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)) and employment
(United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)) the Supreme Court
has recognized that integration is necessary to provide minorities with equal opportu-
nities and eliminate the stigma attached to segregated areas of society. Minorities
seem to gain the most from the BHA plan; the projects that were available to blacks
as minority preference applicants were generally considered to be the more desirable
developments in Boston. This fact coupled with the greater number of units open to
blacks gives the appearance that the plan works to the detriment of whites. (see notes
15-20 supra). The Boston community as a whole will benefit if integration leads to
reduced racial friction and promotion of more tolerant attitudes. See generally T.
PETTIGREW, RACIALLY SEPARATE OR TOGETHER?, 274-78 (1971); Simpson & Yinger,
Equal Status, Housing Integration and Racial Prejudice, in HOUSING URBAN
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The Schmidt court, by refusing to recognize an overt racial classifi-
cation, neglected the opportunity to make a valuable contribution to
civil rights analysis. Although the court may have reached the proper
result, application of the wrong standard added nothing to the devel-
opment of the law. By utilizing the covert line of analysis to judge an
overt racial classification, the Schmidt court promotes confusion in
an area in need of clear and careful reasoning.
Laurence M. Frazen
AMERICA 147 (J. Pynoos, R. Schafer & C. Hartmann eds. 1973). The Plan creates the
opportunity for minorities to move into areas that were previously inaccessible. The
benefits that flow from the creation of this opportunity are sufficiently compelling to
justify the use of racial classification.
At the next step in strict scrutiny analysis, the Schmidt court would have deter-
mined whether the use of benign racial classifications by the BHA is necessary to
achieve integration at their housing developments. The strongest argument against
the necessity of such programs is that integration could be produced by a vigilant
application of the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VIII. But these provisions
do not promote integration or prevent tipping. Although prejudicial fears about the
entry of minority residents are ugly, they are a reality that must be confronted. The
BHA plan assures white residents that black entry into the community will not exceed
the racial balance in the City of Boston. The Plan encourages integration and de-
creases the possibility of white flight leading to resegregation. See note 10 supra.
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